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Introduction
“!e real obstacle to reduction, it is claimed, is the intentionality of mental states; that is, the fact 
that they have content.  For explanations at the intentional level are of a radically different nature 
from those at levels that do not advert to representations and content.  !e latter explanations have a 
good and useful place, but they cannot do justice to the representational dimension of psychological 
life.”¹
Generally, the main skeptical opposition that projects like the Connectome face are 
statements like: It is all very well to explain the machinery and mechanisms of the brain, but 
what will that really teach us about our selves, our minds, what makes us really tick, our 
mental life?  People want to know, “well, what is this really going to teach us?”  !is kind of 
skepticism is grounded in a basic preference for the familiarity of the theories of folk 
psychology.  !ere is nothing entirely wrong with having that preference for your average 
layman, but this is a dangerous idea if it is used to guide the study both of the mind and the 
brain.  I propose that part of the very compelling reason that a project like !e Connectome 
will be revolutionary to our understanding is precisely because it’s object of study is not the 
mind, nor the brain.  Its object is the mind-brain.  !is is a uniquely important step for 
cognitive sciences because it embodies the proper object of study: the mind-brain.  To be sure, 
the explananda of mind-brain will evolve over time as greater understanding of the object is 
gained, but this initial recognition of mind-brain as the proper object of psychological and 
neuroscienti#c knowledge is a crucial one on the path of gaining understanding.
In this paper I set out to argue, and I hope to convince you, that the proper object of study 
for the cognitive sciences is the mind-brain.  !is is not merely a misunderstanding of the 
structure-function distinction as many might say, and it is not an effort to demystify or 
quantify every experience or deny experience that every human being could or will have.  But, 
rather, a framework, for pursuing study of both mental and brain phenomena while 
discovering both mental and brain mechanisms.  For, the case I want to make is that brain 
and mind are not distinct, as some functionalists would have it.  I argue that in seeking to 
know the hows and whys of mind, we will inevitably learn about and need to know the brain, 
and in seeking to know what the brain does and how it functions, we need to know the mind 
and how it functions.  !e two are inextricably linked and any philosophy of mind, of 
psychology, of cognitive science needs to acknowledge the mutual role both the study of the 
mind and the brain has for gaining knowledge.  
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Further, I believe that it is erroneous to suggest that one could gain knowledge of one 
without the other: for the two are two lenses on the same subject.  It is for this reason that I 
argue that a project with as far-reaching aims as !e Connectome Project, has deep 
understanding and implications of what the philosophical problem for both the study of the 
mind and the brain is.  !e Connectome Project, far from being merely the latest and greatest 
in a series of empirical forays into the unknown “for the fun of it” have real bearing on how 
we will conceive of psychological and neuroscienti#c problems in the future.  In fact, we do 
not yet know how far knowledge of the connectome will stretch into scienti#c disciplines and 
it is conceivable that a project such as this will have implications for genetic research, 
evolutionary theory of human minds, language, learning, memory, all aspects of 
neuropsychology, etc.  To ignore its efforts, its triumphs and its failures would be to impede 
real progress in cognitive scienti#c knowledge, and, at its worse, it would mean relegating the 
study of psychology  and its objects into a historical study not unlike mythology.  
I have three goals for this essay:
1) To introduce the reader to the NIH’s Connectome Project, its methods, aims, and 
discoveries.
2) To set this project against a background of materialism/physicalism that supports a 
minimal functional view, but not the ontological commitments of some kinds of 
Functionalism(s).
3) To lay out the bene#ts of such a philosophical view for making predictions, and 
generating hypotheses.
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Chapter One: What Would A 
Connectome Be?
Connectome Project: methods, aims, progress
A major project, supported by the NIH (National Institutes of Health) Harvard-MGH/
UCLA and WU-Minn Consortiums, is underway on the frontier of human mind/brain 
relationship connections research.  !e Human Connectome Project, so-named to recall the 
scope, far-reaching effects, and efforts of the human genome project, is an attempt to map 
and record every neuron in the human brain and its connections to each other.  I contend that 
in order to use this project’s information fruitfully, we must understand its contribution to 
psychological and cognitive science explanation as a part of the material reductionist project.  
Explanation must make reductionist contact with functional types in order for this project to 
make any sense.  Upon arriving at the Human Connectome page, one is greeted by the 
following message:
Navigate the brain in a way that was never before possible; %y through major brain 
pathways, compare essential circuits, zoom into a region to explore the cells that 
comprise it, and the functions that depend on it.!e Human Connectome Project 
aims to provide an unparalleled compilation of neural data, an interface to graphically 
navigate this data and the opportunity to achieve never before realized conclusions 
about the living human brain.
A wide and far-reaching project is opened before us and the promise of its #ndings 
should #ll us with energetic optimism about the future of mind/brain research; but #rst we 
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must dispel with Cartesian dualist intuitions and its legacy of philosophical inheritances.  
Ramón y Cajal had always spoken of the importance of having an accurate basic anatomical 
map of the brain itself prior to the investigation of its physiological and psychological 
functions.²  Francis Crick has often spoken about the basic necessity for hypothesis 
formulation and testing of an anatomical map of the brain, at a level where functional 
characteristics can be mapped on successfully.³  A network analysis of the brain lends itself to 
comparison to organizational brain theories such as Fodorian Modularity and Massive 
Modularity.  Such an analysis could be used to test organizational hypotheses and 
organizational-dependent functional hypotheses.  A #ne-grain detail anatomical map of the 
brain would be a useful comparison tool for neuropsychological de#cits, genetic in%uence 
studies,⁴ structural-functional relationship studies, evolutionary comparison studies, and 
therapeutic effect studies.  It could be a baseline comparison against which to measure 
variance in the population and between conditions and in development.  So, there are lots of 
motivations, but I want to focus on #ndings that suggest that dynamic, complex-system self-
organization principles (in development) contribute towards structure-functional 
relationships found in the human brain.
!e Connectome Project(s) have been greatly in%uenced by work done in the C. Elegans, 
a roundworm with 302 neurons, and work with a larger nervous system in the Aplysia 
californica, a sea slug with 18,000 neurons.  !e totality of neuronal connections have been 
anatomically mapped for the C.Elegans and such a scienti#c achievement has inspired much 
research on nervous system organization and function in other species.  However, nervous 
system organization has signi#cant differences in vertebrates and species that exhibit 
dimorphism (sexual difference).  So, study of the nervous systems of vertebrates and 
particularly species evolutionarily related to humans (such as macaques) remains of high 
neuroscienti#c interest.  !e Connectome Project(s) is an effort to understand principles of 
nervous system organization in humans so as to illuminate aspects of functional organization, 
which may have important implications for functional classes of mental phenomena and 
behavior in humans.  !at is the hope, anyway.
!e Connectome Project(s) seek to detail, as much as possible, structural and functional 
brain connections of subjects under a variety of brain imaging techniques: fMRI, EEG, DTI. 
MEG, and MEA.  !ese “combinations of physiological and anatomical techniques have 
allowed patterns in neuronal connections to be identi#ed, leading to the identi#cation of 
neuronal microcircuits and the formulation of probabilistic connection rules.”⁵  Small-world 
networks (discussed in section Network Motifs, Self-Organization Principles, Graph !eory) 
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have been found to be ubiquitous in the brain and in naturally-occurring systems.  !ese 
identi#cations of microcircuits have been found to be highly positively correlated across 
structural and functional analyses.  DTI (Diffusion tensor imaging) has shown that key 
structural features of small-world network connectivity.  “Current evidence suggests that 
topological parameters [of small world connectivity such a hub centrality measures, path 
length and clustering] are generally conserved between structural and functional networks.”⁶ 
Such measures of small-world networks, which are a class of scale-free networks, are a 
result of complexity.  “Complexity arises in the macroscopic behavior of a system of 
interacting elements that combines statistical randomness with regularity…and⁷ is shaped by 
interactions among their constituent elements.”⁸  Such complexity found in the human brain 
echoes existing knowledge that we have of development and network elaboration which 
compromises between the competing demands of developmental genetic imperatives and 
environmental (cellular, regional, global, external) statistical unpredictability.  Such competing 
inputs to the system can be conjectured to be contributing to the apparent organization of the 
system.  However, this remains to be explored in detail.
Questions about the relationship between structure and function will continue to haunt 
empirical efforts such as !e Connectome Project, however, there are some initially 
encouraging results about the possibility of reductive contact being made between these two 
classes of knowledge.  Some plasticity studies of mammalian cellular networks suggest that 
these are constantly undergoing change, whereas other evidence indicates that most synaptic 
spines are stable.⁹  !e relative stability of structural networks provides a point of reference in 
studying brain networks.  Using structural networks as a comparison for studying functional 
networks, there has been much encouraging evidence that suggest initial avenues to pursue 
the structural-functional relationship questions.  “Patterns of functional connectivity undergo 
spontaneous %uctuations and are highly responsive to perturbations, on a timescale of 
hundreds of milliseconds.  !ese rapid recon#gurations do not affect the stability of global 
topological characteristics.  On longer timescales of seconds to minutes, correlations between 
spontaneous %uctuations in brain activity form functional networks that are particularly 
robust…[these] comprise the default mode network.”¹⁰ !ese ‘resting state’ (there is some 
disagreement about this measure)¹¹ patterns provide an opportunity for comparison against 
structural networks and initial #ndings “suggest that structural connections are highly 
predictive of functional connections.”¹²  !is is an early and rough suggestion about how 
structural and functional networks share topological connectivity features.  Obviously, there is 
much more to be explored by way of how structural features support %exible functional 
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connectivity on the variable timescales that exist.
Some early explorations into how structure and function might relate use computer 
simulations, with empirically derived parameters of connectivity to see what kinds of activity 
such structural relationships might support.  Such studies have “demonstrated the emergence 
of complex spatiotemporal structure in neural correlations at multiple timescales.”¹³
!ere are many features of small-world networks (again, see Network Motifs, Self-
Organization Principles, Graph !eory for discussion) such as clustering, reciprocal 
connectivity, and hubs (or modules) that have been found in synaptic connectivity circuits.¹⁴  
Several areas of the brain have been found to act as structural and functional hubs such as the 
precuneus, the insula, and the superior parietal cortex and the superior frontal cortex.¹⁵  Such 
#ndings of network similarities between functional and structural networks present the 
intriguing hypothesis that these functional aspects can be explained on the basis of its central 
position in the network.¹⁶  !ere are also initial indictions that structural motifs confer speci#c 
functional abilities upon a network.¹⁷
Models as Instruments & Mediators of Knowledge
Modeling the human brain requires an immense amount of data.  !e human brain has 
an average of one hundred billion neurons with an average 7,000 synapses each. For adults 
this is between 100 to 500 trillion synapses.¹⁸  !ere is exactly one other creature for which the 
level of speci#city sought for the human brain has been worked out: Caenorhabditis elegans.  
C. Elegans is a 1mm long roundworm with exactly 302 neurons,¹⁹ making it one of the 
simplest organisms with a nervous system.  A complete structural connection map has been 
worked out for the C.Elegans.  !is was an enormous undertaking comprising years of 
collaborative manual eye-under-the-microscope efforts to map every single connection from 
each of those 302 neurons to each other.  As nervous system increase in complexity, the 
efforts required to map these systems multiply exponentially quickly going beyond the reach 
of manual labor limits.  Given that the human brain’s neuronal complexity is several orders 
more complex than that of the C. Elegans, and that many of the techniques that are available 
to researchers of small organisms are unethical in humans, new approaches and techniques 
will bene#t the effort.  
Broadly, the Human Connectome Project can be seen as an attempt to #nd an 
explanatory rubric by which to see the human brain to interpret and predict its function and 
structure.  !e NIH-²⁰funded Human Connectome Project’s goal, as complex and multi-
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faceted as it is, involves the modeling of various types of data utilizing various imaging and 
cellular-DNS staining techniques, and amalgamating a variety of data in an attempt to 
provide future researchers a broad overview of brain anatomy of the kind and detail that we 
lack today.  In addition to structural modeling, the Human Connectome Project also 
incorporates functional imaging techniques and compares these graph-network models with 
network results found in the structural models.  
I like to think that one of the central intuitions driving this effort is that structure has an 
important relationship to function, although the exact relationship is, as yet, unknown.  Given 
that many of the methods that are used in smaller organisms are unavailable for study in 
living human brains, it is necessary to model the brain’s neuroanatomy from indirect measures 
of brain connectivity.  While indirect measures, still, the early results from these techniques 
suggest that much of structural connectivity attributes are mirrored in functional connectivity 
measurements and vise versa.  One of the interesting #ndings of the human connectome, thus 
far, has been the ways in which structural network measures overlap with functional network 
measures (see Network Motifs, Self-Organization Principles, Graph !eory for discussion).
!ere are important respects in which models play a key role in linking levels of structure 
and knowledge.  Models, by their nature, allow us to link meta-level phenomenon/structure 
with the lower-level, micro-level activities and units that comprise the larger phenomenon.  
!is is because models are capable of representing at two levels: the level of detail that results 
from the model simulations and individual data points and the level of the model which 
includes an organizational aspect by way of principles, abstractions, equations/functions 
depicting an exploratory or proposed mechanism for the behavior of the system.  System 
dynamics will make assumptions in the form of theory.  In using graph network theory 
(discussed in Network Motifs, Self-Organization Principles, Graph !eory) to describe brain 
networks, the working assumption is that one of the main mechanisms of the mind/brain 
functioning is that based on network connective properties.  !is is a fairly sound assumption 
given what we know about the communication of neuronal cells via their synapses.  !e 
details of the submechanisms and supportive mechanisms (such as synchrony, 
neurotransmitter activity, etc) are unknown, however, given what we do know, it is a 
worthwhile bet to suppose that much of brain functionality is underpinned by network 
connections and network connective properties.
Some of the virtues of a model lie, in part, on its partial independence from the data.  In 
the construction of a model, combination of information from different sources and 
abstractions are necessary since full dependence on either data or on theory is unhelpful.  To 
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be useful, models must be hybrid kinds of world data and theoretical parameters.  If a model 
were completely dependent on theory, it would be a theory.  If a model was just an 
amalgamation of data, it wouldn’t have any further organizing principle by which to 
conceptualize the system for us.²¹  “It is precisely because models are partially independent of 
both theories and the world that they have this autonomous component and so can be used as 
instruments of exploration in both domains.”²² (Emphasis mine)  It is this partial dependence 
on data and on theory that creates a credible, organizational principle upon which to test 
further hypotheses, and an avenue by which to ‘observe’, by simulation of the model, instances 
which may not be observable.  !e model becomes an autonomous instrument of exploration 
that mimicks the object of study in relevant ways.  Being an instrument is a more powerful 
way to view the world and draw inferences about both our theories and our subject of study, 
but it is equally important not to mistake the model for the world itself.  Put differently, we 
must remember that our tools do not necessarily carve up the world at its joints.  !e best we 
can understand models are as mediating instruments between the world for our conceptual 
understanding.
Using a model as an instrument, it is also important to remember that it will always be 
relative to the domain or relevant aspect of which we are interested.  !is does not mean that 
it cannot inform domains outside that of the model’s object.  However, it is important to 
realize that conclusions, predictions, and observations made from a model will be domain-
relative.  Despite domain-relative predictions and observations, it is important to recognize 
the transformational aspects of a model insofar as it can link across higher levels (model as a 
whole) and lower levels (individual data points and observations).  !is duality of models 
diversi#es the in%uence that any particular model can have to other domains; herein lies their 
epistemic power.  
A model that straddles the two worlds of theory and observation, and thereby remains 
partially autonomous from both, enables us to test and learn both our theories and predictions 
about the world.  We use models as instruments to build and correct theory.²³  A model can 
allow us to see system requirements for certain effects or behavior, points of in%ection in 
systems, critical observations in simulations that are not observable or have not yet been 
observed, and for investigating any characteristics’ relationships to each other that are 
included in or accounted for in the model in some way.  In allowing us to visualize or test 
events, system behavior, and model parameters (ultimately linked to theory), a model provides 
us with lots of opportunity for hypothesis testing and hypothesis generation.  !is hypothesis 
generation and testing will then lead to further modeling, further theorizing, further 
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conceptualizing, further testing, and further explanations.  !e epistemic power of models 
comes through their construction and use.
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Chapter Two: Reductive 
Contact
Skeptics, Dualists, Principled Skeptics
Why must explanations around !e Connectome make reductive contact with our folk 
notions of psychological explanation?  Well, in short, because !e Connectome seeks to 
understand how structure belies function, or at least, what the relationship between the two is. 
!e Connectome’s #ndings, thus far, suggest that structure and function are closely allied, and 
in some cases, synonymous.  To posit any kind of dualism about function begins to feel like 
placing a ghost in the machine or just an outright refusal to believe that our mental lives are 
conducted in our brains and/or our bodies.  Further, there seems to be a kind of insincerity 
implicit in the kind of skepticism that accepts that vision is supported by structures of the 
brain, but denies that other sorts of thoughts and feelings are not supported by the brain.  
What is this kind of dualism owed to?  What kind of science wants to place more 
responsibility for one kind of process at the feet of something "mental" while conceding that 
other processes, supposedly conducted by the same apparatus, as something “less than 
mental?"  What on earth is this?
Well, it might be important to sketch out the kinds of criticisms I'm facing from the 
skeptics.  As Churchland delineates quite nicely, there are two main kinds of skeptics: 
Boggled Skeptics and Principled Skeptics.  I will be taking you on a short tour of these 
skepticisms with an emphasis on the criticisms of the principled skeptics.  
!e Boggled Skeptics are the kinds that believe that there is no hope for scienti#c 
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reduction of mental phenomena to mechanisms of the brain because it's all too hopelessly 
complex, impossible, absurd, incoherent, or it is otherwise a fool's errand to suppose such 
reduction is even possible, or that the human brain is as capable of learning about its own 
mechanisms as it is capable of using them.  I won't waste our time with these and allow the 
already impressive progress of science be my reference upon which my optimistic opinion in 
response to this kind of pessimism.  !is kind of pessimism is neither pragmatic nor 
necessarily true (pragmatism being a virtue in knowledge acquisition), and it seems foolish to 
spend time trying to defend against what ultimately amounts to a strong opinion without 
very much support.
Principled Skeptics divide into two kinds of dualists: substance dualists and property 
dualists.  Substance dualists are those that believe that there is something else to the mind 
that is not just "brain stuff."  !ere is "brain stuff" and "mind stuff" of some description.  
Generally, these skeptics will talk about this other substance as mind-substance (whatever 
that is tends to be notoriously vaguely de#ned), the soul, other kinds of non-physical 
instantiations of the mind or minds that exist outside the brain (e.g. “Extended mind”), or 
something that is just "beyond" that substance merely found in the brain.  Basically, for them, 
looking at the brain for the stuff of at least some mental phenomena is just foolish: for it 
won't be found there.  Substance dualists’s basic argument form: reduction is impossible 
because psychological theory and neuroscienti#c theory are theories about fundamentally 
different things: mind substances and material substances.  And, as such, one will not yield 
knowledge of the other and vise versa (by parity of reasoning).  Brain doesn’t inform mind, 
and mind doesn’t inform brain.  !e kinds of evidence given for these kinds of assertions tend 
to be the experience of consciousness, what it is like to have thoughts, the qualia of life, if you 
will.  Other evidence given for the existence of non-physical mind stuff points to the human 
capacity for language and reasoning, which is thought to be unique (although it may exist on 
a continuous evolutionary spectrum).  !e main problem with this theoretical approach 
(besides its potential for being wrong) is that it is often used to justify not just the search for 
mental phenomena outside of the brain, but worse for ignoring the brain and the #ndings of 
neuroscience, which to me, seems ludicrous and irresponsible science for the sake of 
maintaing an intuition about mental experience that may or may not be correct.  
For property dualists, the case is somewhat different although much of the evidence cited 
for their case shares many similarities with the substance dualists, with the caveat that the 
substance is the same, but its properties are different.  !is case has more credibility and is the 
more compelling of the dualists' claims mostly in virtue of the fact that they do not have to 
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contend with the difficulty of the problem of the nature of the the two different substances’ 
interactions with each other which, as will be seen, very quickly becomes intractable.  In 
service of property dualism claims, the evidence presented and appealed to also derives from 
the qualities of experience (qualia), and human wonder at our own ability to reason and use 
language.  !e assertion is that subjective experience is irreducible.  !is assertion, I claim is 
ultimately an empirical question, not an a priori matter of de#nition or categorization.  
Property dualists further subdivide into Emergentist-Emphasis-Functionalists and 
Intentional-Emphasis-Functionalists.  Emergentists argue that mental properties and the 
phenomena of psychology are emergent properties of the brain, and in virtue of being 
emergent, irreducible to properties of the brain.  !is is a subject of some confusion as the 
term can be equivocated and used differently throughout the literature.  As Churchland 
elucidates, “Emergent property” is also used in the neuroscienti#c literature with a quite 
different sense roughly equivalent to “network property.”…Although this is a useful sense of 
“emergence” (which Dennett calls “innocent emergence”), it is clearly not the sense intended 
by property dualists in their arguments against reductionism.”²⁴  However, when 
antireductionists use emergent properties as a reason why neuroscienti#c theories cannot 
make contact with psychological ones, they are not simply saying that these properties are 
simply network properties.  If they did, this would be making reductive contact with the 
neuroscienti#c aspects of the phenomenon and the goal of reduction would be achieved.  !e 
Emergenists in the philosophical literature take it a step further.  !ey argue not only that we 
can not now identify brain states that correspond to our experiences, but that they cannot in 
principle.  !is seems needlessly overcon#dent about what brain states are (which is an 
empirical question), what they do, and whether or not our experiences correspond to states of 
the brain or other aspects of the brain, as yet undiscovered.  And they do not assert this 
simply because neuroscience has, as yet, been unsuccessful in characterizing experience in 
terms of brain states, but they use the short history of neuroscience as evidence that this will 
never be possible.  And it is from this impossibility, in principle, that Emergentists posit the 
existence of a property dualism in order to do the explanatory work of why neuroscience has 
not yet made reductive contact with psychology and/or experience.  
Another argument often used in support of anti-reduction starts from the nature of 
subjective experience itself (qualia).  !e argument is that knowing does not cause or bring 
about the sensation itself, and thus the experience is irreducible to knowledge of the 
experience.  ( Jackson’s Mary !ought Experiment) Whether or not this is ultimately true is 
itself an empirical question.  However, there is nothing about the reductive program of 
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explanation that requires that knowledge of a phenomenon cause the phenomenon itself.  
Causing a phenomenon does not identify it with the phenomenon and no one argues that it 
should.  “Nobody said light did not exist after the reduction of optics to electromagnetic 
theory; rather, they said light is electromagnetic radiation. And nobody said the laws of optics 
were useless or in disgrace.  Notice that on this scenario, it would make perfectly good sense 
to talk about mental states causing brain states, since mental states turn out to be states of the 
brain (cf. Sperry 1980, Eccles 1977).  Nor is a special notion of causation needed, as Sperry 
(1980) suggests.”²⁵ 
Another kind of argument that tends to emerge (pun-intended) from the Emergentist- 
Functionalist-In%uenced camp of thought are those arguments originating from multiple 
realizability.  Notice that the arguments from multiple realizability/ instantiability are just a 
special case of boggled skepticism and impossibility arguments that we have seen earlier.   
Multiple realizability arguments take their starting point from an analogy (generally) to 
arti#cial intelligence systems, which tend to be a faulty analogy for a variety of reasons of 
which I will not go into here.  It is well known that an arti#cial intelligence system, and 
indeed, humans, may be performing the same function whilst their supporting mechanisms 
may be quite different.  Different individuals may be seeking help (in the classic burning 
building thought experiment) in a variety of ways based on a variety of beliefs about help 
being needed, but they are ultimately all seeking help.  However, the very fact that variance 
occurs in systems, populations, or, indeed, brains is simply not enough to warrant a claim 
against the possibility of reduction.  !e simple existence of multiple solutions to a problem 
does not necessarily mean that there aren’t ways in which it is being done, or that those 
multiple possibilities defy reductive explanation.  It would indeed be a prize to behold a 
science that could not only make reductive contact with phenomenon that we perceive at 
higher levels of abstraction but also that could account for the variety of realizations these 
phenomena could take.  !e argument takes for granted that having multiple realizations is 
inconsistent with reductive explanation.  !ere may be more than one way to skin a cat, but 
the way this particular cat is skinned, at this time, under these conditions, within narrow-
enough de#ned investigative constraints is not a matter of multiple realities.  And if there is 
indeed variation, we are in a better epistemic position to explore the other variations once one 
version is understood.  
Multiple realizability also assumes that in order for reduction to make any sense, there 
must be a unique solution that matches reductive knowledge to higher level understanding of 
phenomena.  !is view errs with three strong assumptions of what a level is, that we know 
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what parts of biology matter for function, and how they interrelate.  !is assumption that 
intertheoretic reduction is a simple one-to-one match up game gives the reductionist program 
too little credit while assuming that Functionalism has a monopoly on complex explanation 
via its emphasis on function.  Further, this assumption assumes that our higher level 
understanding of phenomena is perfect as is, and will never be subject to revision.  All of 
these assumptions are potentially false, and worse, insidious for science.  Doing science under 
a framework that assumes what kind of biology matters, what a level is and how levels 
interrelate, rather than viewing these assumptions as revisable hypotheses risks misleading 
investigation in the long-term, if not inde#nitely and encouraging unfruitful, dead-end types 
of investigation.  
And the #nal kind of principled skeptic to address are the Functionalists that take the 
intentionality of mental states to be their primary source of evidence for why reductive contact 
between observed higher level phenomena and lower-level investigation will fail.  
Intentionality Functionalists take a property dualism as their starting point: mental states are 
intentional and have content and, for this reason, they are irreducible to mechanism.  !e 
content cannot be done justice by the reductive explanation.  On this view, contents, 
representation, and intentionality are objects of explanation which require a different kind of 
explanation to what reduction seeks.  Because this is a functionalist view and the emphasis is 
on causal relations between intentional states, and these states are irreducible to non-
intentional mechanisms, no reduction is possible and investigation can only take place at the 
level of intention, or at the levels on which speaking about intentionality remains a coherent 
concept.  !is view assumes that intentional states must always be described and explained by 
intentionality, and that there is only one way to access intentionality through representational 
relationships.  !us, denying the notion that perhaps there is a common linkage between 
reductive levels of explanation and representational levels of explanation.  !is is, itself, a 
controversial view, to be sure, but it seems rather less improbable than minds being composed 
of sentential-like, representative intentional states all the way down to the lowest level of 
description.  I take Patricia Churchland’s view here: “!ree brief points on this discussion of 
the philosophy of language. 1) It is rather far-fetched to suppose that intuitions in the 
philosophy of language can be a reliable guide to what science can and cannot discover about 
the nature of the universe. 2) Meanings change as science makes discoveries about what some 
macro phenomenon is in terms of its composition and the dynamics of the underlying 
structure. 3) Scientists are unlikely to halt their research when informed that their hypotheses 
and theories “sound funny” relative to current usage.  More likely, they will say this “the 
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theories might sound funny to you, but let me teach the background science that makes us 
think that the theory is true.  !en it will sound less funny.”²⁶ 
 !ere seems to be a deep stalemate brewing around the rightful object of study for the 
cognitive sciences, which I suspect stems from a deep-seated fondness for our own experience 
of life.  Both sides seem to suffer from a deplorable lack of imagination- in what physical 
structures can realize about experience, and in what whether experience might be realized in 
something other than a physical structure.  Why this argument about structure?  Why are we 
divided on this issue?  What is so antagonistic about physicalism?  Why is it anathema to so 
many ears?  It is our affective fondness for something “beyond” and something exalted about 
the human condition?  I maintain that this fondness and sense of wonderment for human 
experience need not be lost in the search.  We can maintain (even expand) our childhood 
wonder and love of human experience even while conducting physicalist, scienti#c research as 
to the mechanisms and structures that underpin it, or are, in fact, the realizers of our beloved 
human experience.  It is in fact, unsurprising that we should love our own experience so 
much: for we know that as a matter of evolution, human individuals that do not experience 
their experience as pleasurable develop maladaptive depressive coping strategies and, in some 
cases, display a dangerous tendency towards self-annihilation.  Even such knowledge has 
become an empirical matter whilst its experience remains deeply personal, as it should be.  
Physicalism is not a campaign to suck the joy out of life; but to ensure that our scienti#c 
progress tracks the rightful objects of knowledge.
Functionalists, Functionalism, and function
Part of the assumptions that I make in this essay when talking about brain events that are 
related to mind events, I take reason of why the mind is probably not (only) a functional kind 
(see Reductive Contact section).  For Functionalist mind "different levels of explanation are 
linked by the relation of realization and 2 different levels of explanation operate at different 
levels of functional decomposition."²⁷  However, I believe that what we call a ‘level’ from this 
point of abstraction is actually a deeply problematic issue and remains an artifact of 
abstraction, when in reality the pleiotropy of genes, synapses and networks on mind 
phenomena makes demarcating ‘levels’ much less clear.  !is is partly why I believe that 
modeling network effects is a promising avenue within which to explore mental phenomena 
links with lower ‘level’ phenomena.  So I believe modeling can bridge these explanatory gaps 
and #nd reductive contact with ‘lower level’ action.  Schemas and dynamic model exploration 
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will link the abstractions of global (& mental) system behavior to brain behavior data points.  
I therefore propose that a minimally functionalist notion, coupled with a strong physicalism is 
a necessary view in our mind/brain explorations.
SO, I would like to defend the importance of the place of function in any theory of 
neuroscience and cognitive sciences without espousing the kind of Functionalism that entails 
with it particular kinds of ontology about mental states and what kinds of explanations will 
ultimately suit mental phenomena and carry causal explanatory weight.  To start with, I'd like 
to distinguish between what being a Functionalist (with a capital F) entails and what the role 
of distinguishing and highlighting functional types with regard to mental phenomena is.  
Functionalists carry ontological commitments to what kinds of explanation will ultimately 
satisfy our interest in psychological explanation of mental phenomena.  !e Functionalist 
typically envisions that a mental kind (this is the ontological commitment) is going to be a 
phenomena of a functional kind such that it is multiply realizable by the brain substrate that 
supports it, which thereby renders the project of reduction and reductive explanation 
impossible.  Function distinctions, on the other hand, are quite necessary to the progress of 
neuroscience and the project of discerning the kinds of processes that the mind/brain is 
capable of conducting.  Hereforth, I want to make clear that I am taking issue with a 
particular %avor of Functionalism that takes the very ontology of function to be of an 
irreducible quality such that levels of explanation between neurobiological substrates and 
causal, mental phenomena will never be realized (despite the physicalist view of the 
Functionalist).  Function, as I will use it will be an entirely unspooky phenomenon and will be 
a kind of explanation among the many types when it comes to the object of study: mind/
brain.  
Primarily, I will be combating kinds of Functionalism that posit functional kinds as a 
rare#ed type that cannot be explained by any reductive material kind.  !is is not to defeat 
that notion that it may, in theory, be possible for a function to be realized in the brain in a 
number of different ways, but only to deny that the simple possibility of multiple realizability 
of a function won't preclude a consistent reductive material explanation at some appropriate 
level of explanation.  Further, I maintain that it is perilous for research to methodologically 
assume a priori what structure or what function will be doing the explanatory work for the 
macrophenomena for which we seek explanation.  !e main point here is that it is important, 
while doing exploratory research, to maintain a level of agnosticism as to whether a functional 
kind, multiply realizable, or a structural kind, multiply %exible and/or optionally 
operationalized will explain any particular meta-categorized mental state, as we currently 
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describe them.  
A further problem, which I will explore a little bit further on (see Language Matters! 
Reduction & Categories of Folk Psychology), is that functional kinds, as we currently 
delineate them, are very probably incomplete, inconsistent or incoherent.  !is is a view that 
functionalists and neurocomputationalists alike hold.  It is likely that what we envision as 
'memory' or as 'consciousness' very likely has various aspects, components, or clusters of 
functionality, if you will.  As we #nd better ways of describing what the brain actually does, 
we may #nd better ways of conceptualizing the macro level phenomena that we seek to 
understand, and in the process, we may gain other ways of describing the macro level 
phenomena that better #t their function and structural implications.  J.Z. Young puts this 
point nicely: "[f ]urther information should allow us to replace the single concept of mind and 
mental activity by others more fully descriptive of the modes of action of brain processes."²⁸ 
( J.Z. Young, 1978)
In order to make the distinction I am drawing clear, I'd like to bring out a few features of 
the kind of Functionalism I'd like to dispel in our explanatory framework in the use of !e 
Connectome #ndings.  "In general, functional kinds are speci#ed by reference to their roles or 
relational pro#les, not by reference to their material structure"²⁹  !is is a useful notion to keep 
in mind while exploring what both the brain and the mind do.  In denying views of 
functionalism that rule out reductive possibilities, I maintain that a view towards 
understanding function, both of the brain and of the mind, remains critical and important in 
the study of the mind/brain. However, the kinds of views I #rmly believe are counter-
productive are those that 1) maintain that our folk psychology categories of mental states, as 
rooted in our conventional language, are fundamentally correct (!ey are certainly dearly and 
affectionately held, to be sure, but “correct” is another matter.), 2) that these folk psychological 
categories delimit intentional states and logical processes to be explored, uncovered, and 
whose mechanisms will be discovered by science and 3) that these folk psychological 
categories will not reduce to neurobiological explanation.  !e upshot of these kinds of views 
is that neuroscience is unimportant to and can be conducted more or less independently of 
psychological study.  “!e implication for research in the relevant domain of scienti#c 
psychology is that neurobiology is largely irrelevant[!] to discovering an adequate theory of 
information processing at the psychological level."³⁰  I believe the conclusion of this argument 
is in various unstated ways actually motivating some of the premises of the argument.  Namely, 
I believe that, at least in some cases, a lack of understanding and a fear of the complexity of 
neuroscienti#c mechanisms, categories, functionalities motivates a desire to keep 
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psychological functional investigation somewhat distinct and separate from neuroscienti#c 
“mechanistic” understanding (more later on why “mechanistic” may be an unsuitable 
descriptor of neuroscienti#c knowledge).  To be sure, this is not a view all psychologists hold, 
and many do not.  However, it seems to be a view that consistently wins sympathy among 
philosophers and some psychologists and this seems to me a pernicious view that seems to 
perpetuate and encourage dualist views of what the mind/brain is a priori to research.  !e 
strong assumption here is that we know at what level biology matters.³¹  "We simply do not 
know at what level of organization/implementation one can assume that the physical 
implementation can vary but the capacities remain the same."³²  Further, assuming that we 
know at what levels biology matters leads to important assumptions about the kinds of 
research that will be productive and will shape the efforts of our scienti#c enquiries.  I believe 
this is a very high stake which we should be more cautious in approaching when arguing for a 
view of the kinds of science that will and won’t be productive.  It is simply not the case that 
we know at what level biology matters for the kinds of explanations we seek, and knowing 
what a level is, and what matters in biological explanation is a subject that I will go into later 
in my discussions around levels of explanation in biology and !e Connectome.  
!us, immediately, there are three points to address here in regards to this argument: 
1) that folk psychology categories of our conventional language are fundamentally correct
2) that these categories are intentional and logical states, to be explained by neuroscience 
mechanisms
3) that these are non-reductive to neurobiological states
In the following section, I’d like to pursue these three claims of the of the non-reductive 
physicalist, in detail, in an effort to illustrate the ways in which neurobiology is relevant to the 
investigations of psychology and the categories that folk psychology cares about and seeks to 
explain.
Before moving on to these three claims of the antireductionist physicalist, I’d like to 
brie%y express a positive view of the kind of functionalism researchers ought to hold.  !e 
study of function, after all, is useful and necessary for the progress of the cognitive 
neurosciences.  “!e thesis that mental states are identi#ed in terms of their abstract causal 
roles in the wider information-processing system is the core conception that makes 
functionalism functionalism, and it is entirely neutral on the question of reducibility.  
Functionalists can be true blue functionalists without naysaying reduction.”³³  Function 
should be recognized as an exploratory tool in cognitive sciences.  Function is, afterall, a 
category that we impose upon the workings of the brain/mind from our point of view.  But 
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recognizing that we are categorizing behavior by function relevant to human experience 
doesn't automatically mean that the function doesn't exist or that it isn't a viable way of 
categorizing experience and/or brain function.  We simply do not know from this standpoint, 
yet, whether or not the functional categories that we currently have are the best ways of 
referring to the functionalities that the brain/mind does have (vs. the ones that we hypothesize 
they have).  
Language Matters! Reduction & the Categories of Folk Psychology
It’s all very good to speak folk psychology in therapy, among friends, in the pub, at home 
with spouses, children, and other relatives.
However, I suspect that the reason why people are so defensive of folk psychology is 
because they have an emotional/cultural attachment to it, as is natural for the everyday 
language we all employ.  However, just because we are currently attached to the words that we 
use to describe our inner states does not mean that we have always used such words, that they 
are or ever have been accurate ways of describing our own states, or that we are entirely un-
in%uenced by the discoveries and trends in the cognitive sciences.  After all, why would folk 
psychology even be in%uenced by such terminology as “Oedipus Complex” and “Attachment 
Styles” if it weren’t for Freudian psychology and modern affective psychology?  To deny that 
folk psychological concepts evolve or should evolve is just to be historically naive.  Folk 
psychological concepts come in and out of common parlance and in and out of disuse 
according to current knowledge and discoveries.  To suggest that our ways of relating to each 
other through folk psychological terms may evolve is simply to acknowledge what already does 
and will happen.  !is does not mean that we have to start speaking a strange language of 
psychology that none of us understand amongst ourselves right now: merely that as our 
theories of psychology evolve, so, too, will our language of relating to the things that are 
psychologically relevant and important to us.  
Why are we so enthralled with keeping a language that doesn’t work for us?  It must be 
because of the vestiges of the emotive commitment they carry: we want to know that love is 
love, that #ghting is #ghting, that pain is pain and not something else.  But you know what?  
!ey will still mean what we agree that they mean: culturally and referentially.  !ey will 
continue to have their social uses and will continue to mean what we need them to mean 
because they are relevant affective parts of our environment.  Much of affective appraisal 
theory takes this kind of human social necessity as a starting point.  Whether we call pain p-
a-i-n or twenty different subtypes depicting different aspects of it, our cultures, groups, 
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families and societies will still pick out the relevant features for our well-being and use the 
relevant language because that is what we have evolved to do: whether we call it dolor or pain 
or if it remains unnamed.  And pain will even have the same functional features and same 
relevancy so long as humans are built to respond to it.
Other examples of our evolving psychology language include attachment theory, reverse 
psychology, psychology of motivation (spanking vs rewards), and conditions such as 
depression, bipolar, schizophrenia, Down's, Parkinson's, Alzheimer's.  Understanding of all of 
these things has evolved, for example we not longer believe that people are possessed by evil 
spirits when they are found to have some kind of mental de#cit.  As a result of evolution of 
conceptions of psychology and what the mind and brain do, we very often #nd that new 
terminology enters common parlance.  Even now, we #nd instances in which our current 
language somehow fail to characterize adequately or fully for the kinds of capacities or 
de#cits that the mind/brain has.  Memory, for example, is not a unitary concept for cognitive 
psychology.  When it is broken down theoretically, there still seem to be gaps where behavior 
de#es theoretical characterization.  Aspects such as visual, auditory, and working memory 
seem to share some capacities in common while some aspects are dissociable.  What, exactly 
those shared and unshared capacities are, and how they can be affected by age, sex, language, 
culture (just to name a few factors) is still the subject of inquiry and de#nition.  As our 
understanding grows and evolves, we may even #nd that some of the capacities that we had 
ascribed as mental are somehow hybrids of mental, bodily, and cultural capacities. 
I am defending Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism.  “By “eliminative 
materialism”  I mean the view that holds 1. !at folk psychology is a theory; 2. !at it is a 
theory whose inadequacies entail that it must eventually be substantially revised or replaced 
outright (hence “eliminative”); and 3. !at what will ultimately replace folk psychology will be 
the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience (hence “materialsm”). (For philosophers 
who defend this view, see Feyerabend 1963b, 1963c, Rorty 1970, Paul M. Churchland 1981, 
Stich 1983. For neuroscientists whose views are very close to this, see Young 1978 and Crick 
1979.)”³⁴ 
So why hold on to old categories from our social settings in cognitive science if they are 
clumsy for research?  !ere is no need, and further, it causes more harm than good.  Folks 
may not like to hear or not always be interested in understanding the advances of 
psychological science and the niceties and distinctions of behavioral and molecular biological 
science just as folks may not be interested in the minutiae of the mechanism of high blood 
pressure, but will still be interested in knowing what kinds of foods may ameliorate the 
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condition (because it has relevance to their well-being).  For all currently foreseeable 
pragmatic and intensive purposes, this suits us just #ne.  However, the debate needn’t be 
carried into science where it could do more harm than good.  After all, if scientists were 
concerned with sorting out the movement of the spheres instead of gravitational pull, we’d 
have much less progress in physics than we enjoy today.  And our society would be worse off 
for it.   “Even if folk psychology is in some degree 'built in,' as perhaps folk physics may be, 
such innateness does not guarantee its truth, its adequacy, or its immunity from revision.”³⁵  
Ultimately, in defending a language of eliminative materialism, I am advocating a kind of 
theoretical openness.  In maintaining an open attitude to the kinds of characteristics of the 
mental and physical, we allow greater space for interpreting future discoveries of the mind/
brain.  In allowing this theoretical space, we’ll have the conceptual space to consider without 
ontological conceptions about what exactly it is we are looking at.
Even if you don't buy this argument about Folk Psychology categories, the ontological 
commitments that folk psychology carries with it hinders progress in science because it 
mistakes the name of a phenomenon for what the phenomenon is.  !e assumption that 
certain levels of explanation are functional levels, while others are the mechanistic 
underpinnings grossly assumes at what levels functions and mechanisms exist and interact.  
Even if one lets go of any particular kind of nomenclature for constellations of behaviors as 
unimportant, the thrust of the issue that concerns me about Functionalists and needlessly 
hanging on to the categories of Folk Psychology is the problematic rich ontologies that these 
kinds of views presuppose.  Functionalists tend to 1) have a notion that there is a one-to-one 
match up of intertheoretic reduction, and 2) tend to have an erroneous conception of what a 
level is, and 3) how they interrelate.³⁶  Often, the assumption that intertheoretic levels of 
explanation must have a one-to-one match up is piled on top of Functionalist views that 
‘mind stuff ’ will necessarily have a different type of explanation than ‘brain stuff.’  
Functionalists will categorize ‘mind stuff ’ as functionally multiply realizable and only suitably 
described by a functional-level explanation, while brain stuff will only suitably be described at 
the ‘brain-level’ by brain parts, with the implicit assumption that those brain parts are not also 
mind parts.  !is is to assume what parts, level, and kinds of biology matter, what they do, 
what functional signi#cance they carry.   Even if mental states are functional states (which 
they may very well be!) this does not mean that they can not make reductive contact with 
what occurs in the brain or that they are not, in fact, also brain states.
However, “it is evident that there are many levels of organization between the topmost 
level and the level of intracellular dynamics. (See also Lycan 1981a.) And even if there were 
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just three [levels], neurobiological theory challenges that way of specifying their 
organizational description.  How many levels there are, and how they should be described, is 
not something to be decided in advance of empirical theory.  Pretheoretically, we have only 
rough and ready-and eminently revisable--hunches about what constitutes a level of 
organization."³⁷  I propose that some these 'levels' and the ways that they interrelate are 
objects of knowledge that can be at least partially identi#ed by the Connectome Project, 
particularly with regards to networks of the brain.  For the meantime what we have, given the 
biology and psychology vocabulary that we have, are preliminary ways of demarcating levels, 
networks, and assemblies.  Fodorian modularity was one such way of characterizing levels.  
Some ways of characterizing levels will come as a result of our methodologies and we should 
be careful to account for those effects.  Because these are just preliminary ways of 
characterizing networks, there isn't any need to force a pre-conceptual folk psychology 
theoretical #t to our research #ndings.  Further, it is eminently clear that at every 'level' of 
research there are functional questions, questions about the nature of the capacities, questions 
about mechanism and implementation, questions about processes.  "!e point is, even at the 
level of cellular research, one can view the cell as being the functional unit with a certain input-
output pro#le, as having speci#able dynamics, and as having a structural implementation in 
certain proteins and other subcellular structures...Relative to a lower research level a 
neuroscientist's research can be considered functional, and relative to a higher level it can be 
considered structural...!e structure-function distinction, though not without utility, is a 
relative, not an absolute, distinction, and even then it is insufficiently precise to support any 
sweeping research idealogy…!ere is a further assumption, usually unstated, that lends 
credence to the ideology of autonomy [of neuroscience from other cognitive science 
disciplines] and should be debunked.  !is assumption is that neuroscience, because it tries to 
understand the physical device--the brain itself--will not produce theories of functional 
organization…[However,] in doing so, there are up to their ears in theorizing, and even more 
shocking, in theorizing about representations and computations.”³⁸ 
An objection that gets brought up over and over again against the eliminative materialist 
is that it is impossible to talk about the states of the mind/brain that he wants to talk about 
without reference to current folk psychological language and/or theories, which then requires 
the eliminative materialist to adopt the categories of the folk psychologist.  My response (and 
Patricia Churchland’s) to this is simply to acknowledge that we have the language that we 
have now and simply because I need to use it doesn’t mean that I believe it’s the best way to 
describe or characterize the phenomena which we investigate.  It simply means we don’t have 
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anything else at the moment.  “[T]he phenomena that need explaining are speci#ed in the 
vocabulary of the available theory (for example, the turning of the crystal spheres, the 
possession by demons, the transfer of caloric, the nature of consciousness). To tender 
sweeping criticisms of the entire old theory while still within its framework will therefore 
typically sound odd.”³⁹  !is is to be expected in the process of revision and when one theory 
is moving towards a new view with accompanying vocabulary.  Needing to use outdated 
vocabulary for the time being isn’t a criticism of the project of #nding better or more accurate 
characterizations.  
Reductive Contact
Much of the controversy around the nature of reduction surrounds the very real and 
somewhat visceral intuition that the mind is not the simple sum of its parts.  !ere is a 
concept, that I am going to borrow from heavily from in the foregoing discussion of ‘levels’, in 
genetics called pleiotropy.  Genetic Pleiotropy is when a single gene in%uences multiple 
phenotypic traits.  !is effect has been found to be ubiquitous for many many phenotypic 
traits.  Often, altering one gene will have an effect on some or all of the phenotypic traits 
simultaneously and often in ways that we are not yet able to reliably predict.   For genes, if 
you consider selection on one phenotypic trait, it’s entirely possible (probable, in fact) that the 
gene, genes, allele, and/or alleles (which is a version of a gene) that the trait is supported by 
will have effects on other phenotypic traits.  !ese effects may not always be desirable and 
may sometimes have competing results of which some will be bene#cial while others 
detrimental to the organism while have neutral effects for the organism in other cases.  !us, 
selection on a surface feature (phenotypic) will have complex effects on the system and vice 
versa.  Often a phenotypic trait will also be supported by a large number of genes and/or 
alleles.  So, selection of one gene or one allele will not necessarily impact one phenotypic trait 
in a straightforward or predictable way.  Selecting for a part at the level of the system and vice 
versa will not often have one-to-one effects.  It is also not always clear to as at the current 
moment at what ‘level’ a gene is supporting the phenotype.  A gene may simultaneously affect 
sodium channel functioning in particular parts of the body while affecting heart rate, which 
can then affect many other functions of the entire body.  Knock-on effects of genes are in 
addition to those that are multiply supported by a plethora of genetic factors and effects.  
Complexity is inherent.    
Complexity is a fact of the human body and living organisms that is used both in support 
and in attack of Functionalism, Eliminative Realism, Dualism(s), Representationalists, and 
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pretty much everyone.  It is an issue everyone uses for their purpose.  Complexity may not 
necessarily adjudicate in favor of eliminative materialism, but it certainly doesn’t speak against 
it.  !e fact that a function may be multiply realizable or multiply supported by various 
physical structures of the brain and body does not mean that it will be impossible for any 
particular mental function to be described, characterized or otherwise make reductive contact 
with the operations and physicality of the human brain.  What often appears to multiple 
realizability arguments as an insurmountable difficulty about reduction is simply that our 
higher ‘levels’ of explanation are not going to have tidy correlates at the lower ‘levels’ of brain 
function.  Just as a gene may code for a whole family of phenotypic traits, and one phenotypic 
trait, as described by us now, may be supported by whole groups of genes, various mental 
phenomena may be supported by various conglomerations of brain functions, various 
groupings of networks and processes that we do not yet understand or have entirely clear 
ideas about what it is they do, exactly.  So, from the meta-level of description it may very well 
seem hopelessly simplistic to describe such complex mental phenomena as particular classes 
of belief in terms of neuronal outputs, given the variation among individuals and lack of 
clarity that we have about functions at all levels.  It is for this reason that I favor an openness 
to new vocabulary of mental phenomenological states as we understand more about what the 
underlying processes are.  We should be favoring a co-evolutionary approach between classes 
of disciplines that focus on ‘mechanisms’ and ‘functionalities’.  !e more we discover about 
both function(s) and mechanism(s), the more apparent it becomes that these two things can 
not always be segregated either experimentally, functionally or physically.  Take even the case 
of those studies of brain resting state imaging (many of which are used to support some 
conclusions of the Connectome Project)⁴⁰ where it is debated what functionalities can 
reasonably be inferred⁴¹ about the ‘resting state.’  Since human brain science isn’t conducive to 
static observation, taking account of all of those ways in which the system remains 
dynamically engaged at any given point becomes very important and acknowledging the 
inseparability (to some basic extent) of mechanism and function is an important part of the 
puzzle.  !e fact is that discoveries at one ‘level’ will have consequences for other ‘levels’ and 
they will each inform one another.
Part of the worry that I have with the concepts of folk psychology and even with some 
high-level functional concepts is their imprecision.  Although many functionalists (and this 
isn’t everyone) concede that many functions will not be neatly supported wholly and 
conclusively by one or two mechanisms in a clear and direct manner, there isn’t a whole lot of 
energy that goes into discussing what those components might be or how neuroscience might 
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contribute to their functional categories or to the reconceptualization of the nature and 
organization those functional categories, even though it is often admitted that those same 
functional categories and conceptions are less than ideal.⁴²  Take for example the continual 
re#nement of what functions memory uses, what various tasks the category of learning 
includes, and what the variety of phenomenon is generally meant to be encompassed by 
consciousness.  Without more re#ned conceptualization and categorizations, hypotheses 
remain general and clumsy.  It seems to me that if a category is misconceived in part because 
of the conceptions that the current language carries, there ought to be an opportunity for a 
new category ,with attendant re#ned conceptualization, to take hold.  Rather than just %eeing 
immediately to the assumption that because something can not be simply and directly 
explained it must be epiphenomenal.  !is is not to say that it may not, indeed, turn out to be 
epiphenomenal.  But the point is to withhold judgment on that fact until more is known 
about the complexity of the mechanisms, how they interrelate and the possibility that there is 
another kind of causal physicalist explanation that is possible to discover ahead of assuming it 
is epiphenomenal.  
Patricia Churchland uses a very nice analogy taken from Dewan 1976 with what is 
known in engineering as a virtual governor.  Brie%y, a virtual governor is a network of energy 
generators that each individually produce within 10% of a particular frequency of electrical 
power due to %uctuations in current generation.  However, when you put these generators 
into a linked network together, their %uctuations are much much less than 10% and pretty 
near negligible because, statistically, in a network one generator’s overproduction will be 
counterbalanced by another one’s dip.  Together, they consistently deliver a particular 
frequency and are said to function as one generator: a virtual generator.⁴³  !e system, as a 
whole, can be said to deliver current of a particular frequency while the same cannot be said 
of any of its individual components.  However, the effect is clearly attributable to the whole.  
!e question for reduction is this: can one reduce the function of the whole further than at 
the system level?  No, the particular function “cannot be localized more closely than the 
system as a whole.”⁴⁴ However, the phenomenon is composed of each of the generators and 
the phenomenon as a whole could not exist without the network of generators, each 
individual component and all the relationships and functionalities between them.  I am in 
agreement with Patricia Churchland (and others) here insofar as I believe that many current 
categories and conceptualizations of functions of the brain will turn out to be kinds of virtual 
governors.⁴⁵  !ey are meta-level conceptions and observations that we have at this moment 
to describe phenomena and functions of the brain.  However, these are imprecise as to what 
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the functionalities are that support what we observe and it is misconceived to assume that 
those levels will match up with the meta-levels in any clear and direct way.  It’s possible, but 
not looking likely.  In reduction, the point is that our theories make reductive contact with the 
physical levels in such a way that the possibility of explaining causal relationships between 
physical states, mechanisms, and structures is at least possible.  !ere is good reason to believe 
the the complexity of the mind/brain will lead us in this complex path of reduction because 
“this tends to be the case the more levels of organization there are in the system and the more 
complex the route between input and output, and because of these and other complex factors, 
the characterization of input-output functions and input-output laws will be revised to mesh 
more closely with lower-level discoveries.”⁴⁶
In a co-evolutionary approach, neuroscience and cognitive psychology work hand-in-
hand and side-by-side to adapt, re#ne, and conceptualize 'levels', mechanisms, and functions 
of the mind/brain.  Some examples of research where reductive contact can be made between 
'levels' (and richer reductive contact is hoped for and expected) would be studies such as those 
of“Quinn and his colleagues (Quinn and Greenspan 1984) [who] have found a 
complementary account to explain why certain mutant populations of Drosophila are learning 
disabled, and thus a connection has been made between speci#c genes and the production of 
an enzyme known to have a causal role in learning…Vertebrate nervous systems are much 
more complicated than those of invertebrates, but the Aplysia research has provided a 
framework of hypotheses that structures research on the cellular basis of habituation, 
sensitization, and classical conditioning in the vertebrate brain.”⁴⁷
Further frameworks for hypothesis formation can be expected from anatomical models 
such as the Connectome Project aims to complete.  Anatomical models can provide large and 
various amounts of qualitative data about connections and the kinds of connections between 
neurons and brain regions.  Just as it is helpful to know in what direction a knee joint bends 
for inferring the kinds of movements that a particular creature can perform, it is helpful to 
know the kinds of neurons that are connected to each other, whether they are reciprocal 
connections, whether or not they are inhibitory or excitatory connections, what kinds of 
receptor sites exist, etc.  !is is the kind of knowledge that assists researchers in building good 
arti#cial intelligence models to test the kinds of interactions that such networks have and are 
capable of conducting.  Network behavior results from such simulation experiments can then 
be compared against the behavior of such networks found in humans and other vertebrates to 
test to see if the kind of connection and behavior of the connections hypothesized by the 
model imitates behavior found in nature in revealing ways. For creating useful modeling tools, 
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anatomical studies of naturally occurring intelligent systems are vital for testing parameters 
and making inferences about connectivity and mechanisms. A great example of a study in 
which anatomical studies and anatomical information was deeply in%uential in hypothesizing 
was: “In one of the latter experimental attempts Berger, !ompson, and their associates found 
that after training there was a sort of cellular representation of the behavioral response in the 
hippocampus, and this “representation” developed during the training phase of classical 
conditioning (Berger and !ompson 1978, Berger, Latham, and !ompson 1980).  In the 
performance of the learned response, it occurred prior to the onset of the behavioral response.  
Interestingly, however, lesioning of the hippocampus does not prevent classical conditioning, 
thought lesioning of the interpositus nuclei of the cerebellum does.  Anatomical studies 
reporting pathways and connections have formed the basis for the hypotheses to explain the 
effects, and these hypotheses were important to those studying humans and those studying 
animal models.”⁴⁸  !is is exactly the sort of study that the Connectome Project will inform 
and be useful towards.  Uniting lower 'levels' with higher 'levels' requires intermediary 
knowledge of structures and organizations that link the levels.  Mapping neural connections 
may be one such of those organizational maps. 
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Chapter !ree: !e Road 
Ahead
At What Level(s) does Physiology Matter?
“What the mind-brain is doing—even as described at the level of input-output functions of the 
system—is not an observational matter, to be read off simply by looking at the behaving organism.  
Rather, it is a deeply theoretical matter…!e heart of the matter is that if there is theoretical give 
and take, then the two sciences will knit themselves into one another.”⁴⁹ 
One-sided views of mental phenomena that assume certain kinds of biology matter while 
others are relegated to the pile of “mechanistic implementation detail.” Part of what I #nd 
irritating about these views is that the division between biology ‘that matters’ for explanation 
and biology that ‘doesn’t matter’ is fundamentally an artifact of the ways we conduct scienti#c 
inquiry, not necessarily a re%ection of a division in the natural world.  As David Marr, Daniel 
Dennett, Bermúdez, and others have laid clear, there are various levels of description and 
scienti#c inquiry that yield different kinds, types, and levels of explanation.  I think that we 
have to be careful between confusing intuitions that we have about levels of explanation at the 
personal level with scienti#c inquiry that will be conducted at the subpersonal level.  
Brie%y and generally, the personal level of description encompasses and distinguishes itself 
from subpersonal levels of description by three hallmarks: accessibility to consciousness, 
cognitive penetrability, and inferential integration.  Accessibility to consciousness at the 
personal level of description would be that group of phenomena that an individual would 
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have access to consciously.  Cognitive penetrability would be that group of states that would 
be impacted by an individual’s attitudes, beliefs, emotions and other propositional states.  
!ese states would be in%uenced by changes in these cognitively penetrable attitudes and 
beliefs.  For example, a personal level phenomena that is cognitive penetrable would be 
changing one’s seat on the bus if one believes that the person sitting next to them is 
dangerous.  !is would be a cognitively penetrable personal state.  Inferential integration 
refers to a modi#cation of the principle of cognitive penetrability as an identi#er of the 
personal level.  Inferential integration refers to the direction of in%uence that a propositional 
attitude (such as belief that a person sitting next to you on the bus is dangerous).  !e idea 
behind inferential integration would be a further requirement that a cognitively penetrable 
state would be further identi#ed by the way in which inference from an attitude would be 
sensitive to a personal state or a personal state would be inferentially sensitive to a 
propositional attitude.⁵⁰  However, as Bermúdez points out, “It looks, therefore, as if none of 
these proposed criteria can on its own demarcate the realm of the personal level— and nor, of 
course, should this be very surprising.  Hardly any concepts of theoretical interest can be 
captured within the scope of a neat set of necessary and sufficient criteria.  It is true, 
nonetheless, that the disjunction of the three proposed criteria is a useful tool for picking out 
personal-level states— we can be pretty con#dent that any personal-level state will be either 
accessible to consciousness, or cognitively penetrable or inferentially integrated.  But, as one 
would expect from a disjunction, it tells us little about the real nature of personal-level states.  
For that we would, I think, be better advised to look at the explanatory role that such states 
are called upon to play.”⁵¹
Given that there is an important link between how we conceive the ontology of the mind 
and how we explain it, it’s important to see how our explanations are in%uencing our 
conception of mind/brain ontology and how mind/brain ontology are in%uencing our 
conceptions of explanation.  !e case I want to try is that of how the antireductionists’ claims 
may be based in a mind/brain ontology that in%uences what kinds of explanation are 
appropriate.  Given that mind/brain ontology is the thing about which we are curious, it 
seems to me hardly an issue that can be decided before seeking explanation.  Further, since we 
seek explanation, we must be highly conscious of the ways in which our methodologies of 
explanation impact our ontological views of the mind/brain.  !e contention I make is that 
there are particular kinds of scienti#c bigotry which bias researchers against seeking what may 
very well be a reality of the subject of research simply because their methodologies support 
and privilege certain kinds of explanations and ontologies over others.  What I am ultimately 
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advocating is a kind of openness.
For example: David Marr distinguishes between bottom-up and top-down levels of 
analysis.  Dennett also distinguishes these levels in a way which I feel is more faithful to their 
sociopolitical science properties: intentional stance, design stance, and the physical stance.  
When one studies the mind bottom-up, according to Marr, one is analyzing at the level of 
neurons, molecules, pathways, and action potentials.  When analyzing from the top-down, 
one is taking function, thought, and corresponding mechanisms as the starting point of 
analysis.  !e insight Bermúdez lends to these analyses is that they lend themselves to 
different disciplines of study and analysis.  !is is no small point.  In advocating one view over 
another, one must try to remember where your analysis is coming from and what methods 
and inferences and background knowledge motivates it.  !e dream of the materialist is to 
unite these levels of explanation.  Or, better put, as Churchland says, to #nd reductive contact 
between levels.  Meaning that at the appropriate level of description, the physical material 
explanation will describe the meta-level phenomena we observe at the level of the person.  
!e resistance that comes from the antireductionist camp seems to be premature and needless 
amount of skepticism about whether or not reductive contact can be made between levels.  
!is is often referred to as the interface problem: how do these levels of explanation match 
up?
Dennett’s levels of explanation seem to be better in keeping with the methodological 
aspects of the types of explanations as well as hinting at the kinds of impacts and inferences 
these levels of explanation will imply for the consumers of these levels of knowledge.  !e 
intentional stance can be roughly said to line with with the functional, task-aspects of 
explanation.  At this level general strategies and system-level considerations are examined.  
Next, the design stance considers general constraints and principles (in the absence of “laws” 
in the biological sciences).  !is level is still relatively %exible in terms of the number of 
possibilities which could solve the general problem of performing a task, but it is more 
constrained than the intentional stance level which is the highest and most general problem-
de#nition level.  Finally, there is the physical stance which considers and analyzes how a task 
and solution system set could be physically constructed and implemented/evolved.  !e top-
down analysis approach begins at the functional level and works its way down by chains of 
inference to the physical implementation level.  !e bottom-up approach begins at the level 
of physical implementation, intending to understand it as best it can, while trying to 
understand how these physical implementations may match up, impact, or otherwise inform 
higher levels of functional explanation.  Bottom-up approaches may start from relatively 
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narrow physical constraints with a fairly limited set of functionalities that are understood, 
with a seemingly unimaginable number of ways that these constraints could affect 
functionality at higher levels.  However, through analysis, and in conjunction with 
information about higher level functioning and behavior, these base physical “realizations” of 
higher level function may be further constrained and elucidate in providing explanation.
!e anti-reductive Functionalist (capital F) essentially puts forward his claims for 
methodological reasons: the Functionalist, focusing at the top levels of analysis carries out a 
classical top-down approach which provides fewer constraints for realization at the bottom 
level than an approach which conducts a bottom-up approach to analysis.  !is is where the 
argument from multiple realizability builds a lot of momentum.  !e very notion that a 
particular function may have various realizations is enough to set any theorist’s mind ablaze 
with possibility.  However, the charge the strong Functionalist makes against the material 
reductionist is that the bottom-up approach isn’t going to provide any real insight about 
function.  !is claim seems to be just wrong and overstated.  First, no such opposing view 
exists.  !ere aren’t any reductionists that claim that function is unimportant or marginal to 
their research, and many of them are constantly taking the behavioral functional inputs 
observed as information to fuel their bottom-up level inferences.  Function is vital to the 
reductionist.  One reason I have to oppose this kind of dismissive methodology is that I think 
it’s lazy and overcon#dent that functionalism has a privileged view into the nature of 
cognitive systems that any bottom-up approach could not hope to have.  I believe that the 
only way to make meaningful discoveries about the mental life of humans and intelligence in 
biological systems is to conduct analysis from both levels simultaneously and in a co-
evolutionary way such that both sides of analysis interact and inform each other.   Certainly 
there are better and lesser scientists, but I do not think that in this instance functionalism 
should have a privileged route to knowledge over physicalism.  !ese two approaches can 
coexist, and better yet, interact fruitfully to jointly reinforce our knowledge.  And in their 
cooperation towards a theory of mind, the point is that both approaches have equal stake in 
the kinds of knowledge that are sought, and that both function and physical implementation 
will always be jointly important for explanation.  I also believe that function and physical 
systems will be reciprocally exacting and constraining towards each other when taken jointly 
into account as part of any particular theory of explanation or any one given kind of 
explanation.  But the richness of theoretical explanation depends on the coherence between 
function and physical implementation and vise versa.
!e real question, then, that faces the physicalist is: can we reverse engineer (fruitfully to 
34
gain knowledge) the mind/brain from the level of neurons, networks, action potentials, 
gamma waves, synchronized #ring, white matter networks?  Can we really learn what 
function or task the mind/brain was constructed to perform?  Can we learn at what level our 
neurobiology matters for higher level phenomenon explanation?  And, if we can backwards 
engineer what the mind/brain’s functionalities are from the level of neurons, what problems 
does variability present for analysis and abstraction of function from lower level physical 
systems?
I contend that these hard questions of the possibility of reverse engineering, inferring 
something about function from structure, and discovering at what level(s) neurobiological 
realization matters for higher level phenomena explanation are all things that are questions to 
be empirically tested.  !ese are questions, some of which, the Connectome Project is 
particularly well positioned to learn about initially and perhaps, in the long run, solve. 
Whether or not the Connectome Project will solve all of our questions about the nature of 
intelligence, minds, and brains is unlikely, but that is not the goal.  !e goal is enriching, in a 
meaningful way, that will further our knowledge of the mind/brain and lead us to more 
interesting and more detailed research questions about the mind/brain.  !e Connectome is 
an attempt at framing some kinds of explanatory mechanisms by which the mind works.  We 
know that brain networks play a role in brain function but we do yet know what those exact 
roles are.  It is a matter of inquiry whether or not the network effects are the effectors of the 
mind or just a manifestation of it.  But, right now, as a nascent science, neurobiology and 
neuroanatomy is vitally important in discerning connections, both anatomical and functional, 
that will inform more targeted inquiry by both functional theorists and physical researchers.  
Prior to particular knowledge of connectivity and what kinds of processes such connectivity 
(structural and functional) will in%uence, it seems premature to adjudicate on what level(s) 
physiology matters.  !is is just a matter of exploration at the moment.  !is is a mark of a 
nascent science.
Network Motifs, Self-Organization Principles, Graph !eory
“In this heirarchy, no single level is privileged over others.  !e notion that brain function can be 
fully reduced to the operation of cells or molecules is as ill-conceived as the complementary view that 
cognition can be understood without making reference to its biological substrates.”⁵²
So— , you ask, what can networks and connectomics inform us about the mind/brain, its 
function and its nature?  First, I’d like to say that I believe the question about the nature of 
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the mind/brain is entirely too vague.  Different people mean vastly different things by this 
question, and it is a question that is itself decomposable into parts, some of which are already 
disciplines of inquiry.  So, I’m going to shelf the issue of so-called “nature” of the mind/brain 
as a question that is answered in part, by this entire exploration into what the ontology of the 
mind is, what kinds of explanation we can expect from network theory, and what kinds of 
questions about the mind these explorations will motivate.  What I suggest the connectome is 
is a new, helpful method for organizing information that we gather about mind/brain 
structure and functionality in order to organize further hypotheses and hypothesis testing.  
So, turning to function and mind, I’d like to outline some interesting preliminary #ndings 
about networks which are currently being used to analyze connectivity.  !e devil is in the 
detail, after all.  Network theory can be used to measure several parameters of connectivity, 
which I’d like to outline and describe here, for reference.  !ese measures include: node 
degree, degree distribution and assortativity, clustering coefficient and motifs, path length and 
efficiency, connection density as a measure of cost, hubs, centrality, robustness, and modularity 
(not Fodorian Modularity).  See inset Box 1.
!ere exists a phenomenon that has been characterized across other disciplines that use 
network theory analysis called ‘small world networks’.  Small world networks⁵³ are 
characterized by the efficiency and connectivity of a graph.  See Figure 1.  (!e #gures will be 
helpful throughout this section.) Hubs are highly characteristic of scale-free networks which 
tend to self organize themselves into small-world network properties that enable efficient 
communication between neighborhoods.  For a good visualization of a scale-free network 
please refer to Figure 2.  Scale-free networks are characterized by power-law degree 
distributions.  Power-law degree distributions are mathematical, statistical ways of 
characterizing the number of connections that go through any one particular node.  
Graphically, this can be seen in “hub” small-world kind of organization.  Hub characteristics 
include high clustering and short path length, which are measured against a random 
network’s measurements of clustering and path length.  Small world characteristics can be 
conceptualized as evolution’s compromise between efficiency and cost.  A highly efficient 
connective graph can be conceptualized as one in which every node is connected to every 
other node.  However, this needs to be balanced against the reality of limited resources and 
the cost that it takes to maintain each connection.  !is can be conceptualized in graph theory 
as a relative measurement of density.  A less dense graph will have lower costs associated with 
it than a more dense graph.  So, small-worlds solve the compromise, by essentially picking a 
point through which their messages can be routed through to connect to other parts without 
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sacri#cing their connectivity and maximizing efficiency by maintaining short path length 
(despite the many times in which there will be an indirect connection between two individual 
nodes).  So, efficiency and cost are key diagnostic measurements of whether or not a particular 
network has small world properties, which tend to be characteristic of complex networks.⁵⁴  
Efficiency and cost are measured by path length and connection density, respectively.   
Wonderful illustrations of these differences in connectivity efficiency and costs this can be 
seen at Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 1.  Some examples of natural world phenomena that 
exhibit small world properties are: road maps, food chains, electric power grids, airline %ight 
networks, metabolite processing networks, voter networks, telephone call graphs, and social 
networks.
Small-world properties are endemic to complex networks.⁵⁵  !ey are found at every level 
of biology from cellular networks to social networks to networks of connected proteins. 
Similarly,⁵⁶ transcriptional networks, in which the nodes are genes,⁵⁷ and they are linked if one 
gene has an up or down-regulatory genetic in%uence on the other, have small world network 
properties.  Again, see Figure 2 for a scale-free network visualization.  Now, it seems as 
though the cellular pathways of the brain may well be described as small-world networks 
compromising between maximum efficiency and lowest maintainance cost.  !is 
characterization will be useful to those testing hypotheses of brain organization and functions 
that are dependent upon knowledge of brain organization as it provides a modi#ed view of 
brain modularity.  While Fodor hypothesized that lower level units must operate efficiently, 
on fast biological timescales, and in relative isolation from other inputs and outputs from 
other parts of the brain, the network model will support some intuitions of this view, while 
offering a model of how deeply integrated various parts/modules of the brain are.  !is 
network model offers a way to test modular functional hypotheses based on a structural 
model of connection.
But the Connectome Project, as we have seen at the start of this essay (see Connectome 
Project: methods, aims, progress section), is hoping to correlate and link functional structure 
with physical structure.  As we have seen, they have been moderately successful (putting aside, 
for the moment, the methodological worries that always accompany these kinds of studies 
that use various measurement tools) in correlating measurements of functional networks⁵⁸ 
with measurements of structural networks.  Functional imaging (fMRI, EEG, DTI. MEG, 
and MEA) studies are showing an “encouraging degree of convergence”⁵⁹ in functional and 
structural networks.  
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Box 1⁶⁰
▪ Node: is a vertex on the graphical representation of a network
▪ Node degree: number of connections that link it to the rest of the network.  !is is 
a fundamental measurement upon which the other measures are dependent
▪ Clustering coefficient and motifs: quanti#cation of the number of connections 
between the nearest neighbors.  Random networks have lower clustering.  High 
clustering is associated with robustness because the network has a variety of paths 
to traverse to accomplish the same task.
▪ Path length (efficiency): minimum number of edges that must be traversed before 
one node can connect to another.  Random networks have low average path lengths 
while regular lattices have long average path lengths (see Figure 5 for graphical 
representation of a path)
▪ Connection density (cost): number of edges
total possible edges
▪ Hubs (centrality, robustness): a hub is a node with a high node degree.  Centrality 
measures how many of the shortest path lengths between every other node in the 
network passes through it.  (Indicating centrality)  Robustness refers to how well 
(integrated) the network can continue performing/functioning after a node 
deletion/lesion.
▪ Modularity: Estimated usually based on hierarchical clustering.  !ere are 
provincial and connector hubs.  (Local vs network connectors - a measurement of 
centrality) I would suggest that modularity, as observed from the meta-level is an 
emergent property of the network, much like a virtual governor.  By analogy, I 
would suggest that such functional and structural modularity is at least partially 
similar to the way work groups within a company are partially or fully specialized 
in particular functions.  While the individuals in that #nance department may be 
able to perform many (if not all) of the functions of the individuals in the 
president’s governance office, their particular constellation of factors, including 
their network of local connections, (a partial list of factors contributing to their 
efficiency could be generated) makes them particularly well suited to performing 
their functions as opposed to those functions of the president’s office
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Graph-analytical studies⁶¹ have been used to study functional imaging data in both 
undirected and directed graphs.  Directed graphs (often using Granger causality analysis) can 
be used to derive effective functionality measurements which can predict causal directionality 
in the graphs.  However, most of the studies conducted thus far use undirected graph analysis 
which will just provide an overall measures of connectivity.  !ese functional graph analysis 
studies have been showing common network structures to those measurements taken from 
DTI #ber tract-analysis⁶² (a #ber structural measurement).⁶³  Measurements of global network 
efficiency, clustering, path length, and hubs were found to be similar to those found through 
structural analyses.
So, in relating structure to function, many questions remain to be resolved, many of which 
the connectome’s #ndings will play a key informational role.  We will need to understand how 
functional networks interact with the structure(s).  We need speci#c details and 
measurements about how functional networks change over time- this can best be addressed 
by developmental studies.  Do functional networks exist in a dynamically critical state at some 
or all frequency intervals?⁶⁴  What constraints are imposed anatomically and how does the 
long-term functional history of a network feed back on anatomical development? For all of 
these issues we will need to concretely nail down how the parameters of complex networks 
relate to cognitive and behavioral functions.⁶⁵
In structural analysis of neural connectivity networks, three node motifs were found to be 
prevalent in the C. Elegans.⁶⁶  A preliminary conjecture about connectivity motifs would be 
that different motif classes support particular kinds of signaling.⁶⁷  !is would make it seem as 
though particular network classes will be contributing to particular network functionalities.  
!is has evolutionary origin importance and functional importance of speci#c motif classes.⁶⁸  
Song et al have found much greater than expected likelihood of the occurrence of reciprocal 
connectivity between neurons.⁶⁹  Please refer to Figure 6 and Figure 7.  In Figure 6, you will 
notice that some motifs have a much higher rate of occurrence than others.  And some occur 
very seldom (motifs numbers 5, 8, 10, & 11) and one (7), conspicuously, has a very low rate of 
occurrence.  !is might lead one to wonder about the reasons why this might be, and it could 
lead to interesting hypotheses to test around why some motifs are not as structurally useful as 
others.  Taking number 7 for example, the unidirectional circuit, would this lead to a jammed 
circuit signalling? Spiraling? Could this kind of motif causes some functions to become 
suceptible to have ‘run away’ effects without a stop mechanism?  Is the relative lack of this 
functional circuit nature’s equivalent of a stop function?  Others, such as Prill have shown that 
“different structural motifs facilitate speci#c classes of behavior [such as] periodic, chaotic 
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behavior or [are] promote[rs of ] dynamic stability.”⁷⁰ Still⁷¹ further, others have shown that 
network motifs can exhibit different capacities for synchronization due to their conduction 
delays.⁷²  And “the high proportion of dual dyad motifs […] has been linked to the capacity of 
such motifs to promote zero phase-lag synchrony across great spatial distances and hence 
long conduction delays in cortex.”⁷³  !e structural qualities that node motifs confer upon the 
network properties gives importance to the notion that structural questions will inform 
functional hypotheses.
Applications! Applications! Applications!
“Since Wernicke, Meynert and Dejerine it has been appreciated that many neurological 
and psychiatric disorders can be described as disconnectivity syndromes.”⁷⁴ So we can use 
network properties as diagnostic markers of neurological conditions against appropriate 
comparison groups.  !ese network property markers may also assist us in learning and 
hypothesizing about the kinds of functionalities that are de#cient in such dysfunctions.  
Measurements could be clustering (or lack thereof ) measures, reduced hierarchy, reduced 
centrality, fewer or more greater number of hubs, inefficient connections either by connection 
density or path lengths that are longer than the average.  A couple of  connectivity studies for 
Alzheimer’s and Schizophrenia⁷⁵ have already been conducted and it seems probable that 
other disorders may be linked to connectivity abnormalities.  Whether the abnormality is 
cause or a symptom of the abnormality would remain to be investigated, but such information 
would provide an important jumping-point for hypothesis generation and functional activity 
investigation.  
Additionally, it has been found that many psychiatric conditions (or aspects) are 
heritable.⁷⁶  Given this fact, it’s entirely possible that the kinds of factors that impact 
psychiatric conditions can be found as similar expressions in different, but genetically related, 
brains. “Measures of network topology may be worth investigating as intermediate 
phenotypes, or endophenotypes, that indicate the genetic risk for a neuropsychiatric 
disorder.”⁷⁷ 
Network analysis, as with the computational lesioning studies,⁷⁸ can be used to measure 
vulnerability and to classify different kinds of network vulnerabilities.  Since it theoretically 
conceivable that different connections have different kinds of functionalities, it is possible that 
different kinds of networks, or hubs will have differing vulnerabilities according to the kinds 
of topological or dynamical advantages that the particular con#guration has.  “For example, 
scale-free networks are robust to random error but highly vulnerable to deletion of network 
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hubs."⁷⁹  It is also entirely possible that network analysis can and will be used to understand 
how therapeutic treatments can affect network connectivity or how network connectivity can 
be used to measure how effective a treatment is.⁸⁰
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removed from a clustered neighbourhood to make a short cut has, at
most, a linear effect on C; hence C(p) remains practically unchanged
for small p even though L(p) drops rapidly. The important implica-
tion here is that at the local level (as reflected by C(p)), the transition
to a small world is almost undetectable. To check the robustness of
these results, we have tested many different types of initial regular
graphs, as well as different algorithms for random rewiring, and all
give qualitatively similar results. The only requirement is that the
rewired edges must typically connect vertices that would otherwise
be much farther apart than Lrandom.
The idealized construction above reveals the key role of short
cuts. It suggests that the small-world phenomenon might be
common in sparse networks with many vertices, as even a tiny
fraction of short cuts would suffice. To test this idea, we have
computed L and C for the collaboration graph of actors in feature
films (generated from data available at http://us.imdb.com), the
electrical power grid of the western United States, and the neural
network of the nematode worm C. elegans17. All three graphs are of
scientific interest. The graph of film actors is a surrogate for a social
network
18
, with the advantage of being much more easily specified.
It is also akin to the graph of mathematical collaborations centred,
traditionally, on P. Erdös (partial data available at http://
www.acs.oakland.edu/￿grossman/erdoshp.html). The graph of
the power grid is relevant to the efficiency and robustness of
power networks
19
. And C. elegans is the sole example of a completely
mapped neural network.
Table 1 shows that all three graphs are small-world networks.
These examples were not hand-picked; they were chosen because of
their inherent interest and because complete wiring diagrams were
available. Thus the small-world phenomenon is not merely a
curiosity of social networks
13,14
nor an artefact of an idealized
model—it is probably generic for many large, sparse networks
found in nature.
We now investigate the functional significance of small-world
connectivity for dynamical systems. Our test case is a deliberately
simplified model for the spread of an infectious disease. The
population structure is modelled by the family of graphs described
in Fig. 1. At time t ¼ 0, a single infective individual is introduced
into an otherwise healthy population. Infective individuals are
removed permanently (by immunity or death) after a period of
sickness that lasts one unit of dimensionless time. During this time,
each infective individual can infect each of its healthy neighbours
with probability r. On subsequent time steps, the disease spreads
along the edges of the graph until it either infects the entire
population, or it dies out, having infected some fraction of the
population in the process.
p = 0 p = 1 
Increasing randomness
Regular Small-world Random
Figure 1 Random rewiring procedure for interpolating between a regular ring
lattice and a random network, without altering the number of vertices or edges in
the graph. We start with a ring of n vertices, each connected to its k nearest
neighbours by undirected edges. (For clarity, n ¼ 20 and k ¼ 4 in the schematic
examples shown here, but much larger n and k are used in the rest of this Letter.)
We choose a vertex and the edge that connects it to its nearest neighbour in a
clockwise sense. With probability p, we reconnect this edge to a vertex chosen
uniformly at random over the entire ring, with duplicate edges forbidden; other-
wise we leave the edge in place. We repeat this process by moving clockwise
around the ring, considering each vertex in turn until one lap is completed. Next,
we consider the edges that connect vertices to their second-nearest neighbours
clockwise. As before, we randomly rewire each of these edges with probability p,
and continue this process, circulating around the ring and proceeding outward to
more distant neighbours after each lap, until each edge in the original lattice has
been considered once. (As there are nk/2 edges in the entire graph, the rewiring
process stops after k/2 laps.) Three realizations of this process are shown, for
different values of p. For p ¼ 0, the original ring is unchanged; as p increases, the
graph becomes increasingly disordered until for p ¼ 1, all edges are rewired
randomly. One of our main results is that for intermediate values of p, the graph is
a small-world network: highly clustered like a regular graph, yet with small
characteristic path length, like a random graph. (See Fig. 2.)
Table 1 Empirical examples of small-world networks
Lactual Lrandom Cactual Crandom
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Film actors 3.65 2.99 0.79 0.00027
Power grid 18.7 12.4 0.080 0.005
C. elegans 2.65 2.25 0.28 0.05
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Characteristic path length L and clustering coefficient C for three real networks, compared
to random graphs with the same number of vertices (n) and average number of edges per
vertex (k). (Actors: n ¼ 225;226, k ¼ 61. Power grid: n ¼ 4;941, k ¼ 2:67. C. elegans: n ¼ 282,
k ¼ 14.) The graphs are defined as follows. Two actors are joined by an edge if they have
acted in a film together. We restrict attention to the giant connected component16 of this
graph, which includes ￿90% of all actors listed in the Internet Movie Database (available at
http://us.imdb.com), as of April 1997. For the power grid, vertices represent generators,
transformers and substations, and edges represent high-voltage transmission lines
between them. For C. elegans, an edge joins two neurons if they are connected by either
a synapse or a gap junction. We treat all edges as undirected and unweighted, and all
vertices as identical, recognizing that these are crude approximations. All three networks
show the small-world phenomenon: L ￿ Lrandom but C q Crandom.
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Figure 2 Characteristic path length L(p) and clustering coefficient C(p) for the
family of randomly rewired graphs described in Fig. 1. Here L is defined as the
number of edges in the shortest path between two vertices, averaged over all
pairs of vertices. The clustering coefficient C(p) is defined as follows. Suppose
that a vertex v has kv neighbours; then at most kvðkv ￿ 1Þ=2 edges can exist
between them (this occurs when every neighbour of v is connected to everyother
neighbour of v). Let Cv denote the fraction of these allowable edges that actually
exist. Define C as the average of Cv over all v. For friendship networks, these
statistics have intuitive meanings: L is the average number of friendships in the
shortest chain connecting two people; Cv reflects the extent to which friends of v
are also friends of each other; and thus C measures the cliquishness of a typical
friendship circle. The data shown in the figure are averages over 20 random
realizations of the rewiring process described in Fig.1, and have been normalized
by the values L(0), C(0) for a regular lattice. All the graphs have n ¼ 1;000 vertices
and an average degree of k ¼ 10 edges per vertex. We note that a logarithmic
horizontal scale has been used to resolve the rapid drop in L(p), corresponding to
the onset of the small-world phenomenon. During this drop, C(p) remains almost
constant at its value for the regular lattice, indicating that the transition to a small
world is almost undetectable at the local level.
Figure 1⁸³ 
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Figure 8⁸⁵
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Figure 7⁸⁶            
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Figure 6⁸⁷
47
Figure 2 ⁸⁸
Examples of a random network and a scale-free network. Each graph has 32 nodes and 32 
links. Note that both were chosen to be connected and to look nice on the plane, so they are 
not entirely random.
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